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LIKE GRADE AND QUALITY:
EMERGENCE OF THE COMMERCIAL STANDARD
Although it has long been argued that the Robinson-Patman
Act is at least wretchedly drafted2 if not ill-conceived and at
philosophical odds with the antitrust law from which it purportedly
stems,3 this much is clear: an attempt was made to confine the
operation of section 2(a) to transactions involving unfair or un-
warranted price differences. 4 The express inclusion of the phrase
"like grade and quality" within section 2(a) was a manifestation
of that effort.6 Survivors of the original section 2 of the Clayton
1 Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958):
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality... !'
Although the phrase, "like grade and quality," is not included in the language
of 2(d) or 2(e) of the act, it has been added by interpretation to 2(d), Atlanta
Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1958); Golf Ball Mfrs.' Assoc.,
26 F.T.C. 824, 846-47, 851 (1938), and the addition seems likely for 2(e). See Austin,
Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act 128-29
(2d ed. 1959), asserting that "the words 'such products or commodities' at the end
of Section 2(d) have been construed as . . . referring to goods of like grade and
quality, and the same limitation will no doubt be read into Section 2(e)."
2 Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1951); Att'y Gen. Nat'l
Comm. Antitrust Rep. 130 (1955); Austin, op. cit. supra note 1, at 5; Howard,
Legal Aspects of Marketing 152 (1964). Congress was aware of the probable con-
fusion at the outset. Representative Celler commented on the conference report:
"[T]he bill ... contains many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the devil's
own job to unravel the tangle.. . . [W]e have what might be termed ... a 'hodge-
podge.' . . . You have the herculean task to make it yield sense." 80 Cong. Rec.
9419 (1936).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936): "The purpose of this
proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality of opportunity in
business by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting trade and commerce
against unfair trade practices and unlawful price discrimination. . . "; Rowe, Price
Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act 11-23 (1962); Adelman, "Effective
Competition and the Antitrust Laws," 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1334-35 (1948) ; Rowe,
"Expectation Versus Accomplishment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-1960:
A Statement of the Issues," in 17 A.B.A. Section of Antitrust L. Proceedings 298,
301 (1960). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951).
4 See Rowe, "Expectation Versus Accomplishment," supra note 3, at 301: "The
Act retreated from the Patman bill by prohibiting only price discrimination having
injurious competitive effects, and expressly recognized the seller's right to vary his
prices to meet a competitor's lower price in good faith . . . ."; Howard, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 50; Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 29-30 (1959).
5 Although the concepts of grade and quality were artifacts of the original
§ 2 of the Clayton Act, they received new attention in the amendment process. See
notes 119-22 infra.
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Act,6 wherein they constituted a defense, the concepts of grade
and quality were elevated by the 1936 amendment to a jurisdic-
tional element of the new section 2(a). 7 "The primary function of
the 'like grade and quality criterion,'" then, "is reasonably to con-
fine the price discrimination statute to comparable private business
transactions.""
THE FTC AND THE COURTS
The Federal Trade Commission's treatment of "like grade
and quality" has been the principal source of its interpretation,
and there has been a seeming dichotomy in Commission decisions.
One line of cases deals with alleged discrimination in price between
commodities bearing some degree of physical differentiation. Only
this complex of cases has produced decisions holding that the com-
modities were of dissimilar grade or quality, and the rationale of
those decisions has been elusive: some seem to rely on nothing
more impressive than the fact of minute physical difference; others
disregard significant distinctions; still others have ostensibly re-
lied on style or design factors.
The second line of cases consists of those involving alleged
discrimination in price between commodities differing in brand
alone. The Commission's position here has been monolithic: brand
differentiation alone has not been seen to create a difference in
grade or quality.
The dichotomy, however, is not a bifurcation of inconsistent
approaches to the "like grade and quality" issue. The Commission
has uniformly used what may be deemed a "laboratory approach"
in its resolution. Whether or not goods are of like grade and quality
has depended, in the FTC's view, on the results of a physical com-
parison test. The dichotomy, then, reflects nothing more than a
simple rule of thumb: only those commodities bearing physical
distinctions can feasibly be of dissimilar grade or quality, thus
warranting further "laboratory analysis." Commodities different
6 Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) : "Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities
on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold... .
7 Supra note 1. Rowe, "Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The
Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act," 66 Yale L.J. 1, 36 (1956) ("the jugular
concept of 'like grade and quality'").
8 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 157 (1955). See Cassady & Grether,
"The Proper Interpretation of 'Like Grade and Quality' Within the Meaning of Section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act," 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241-42 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as "Like Grade and Quality"], for the statement that "by this provision the
legislators attempted to avoid interference with the pricing of unlike commodities,
which might well have been .. . unconstitutional."
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in brand alone are deemed a priori to be of like grade and quality;
if it be known that the goods are otherwise identical, no further
analysis under the Commission's "laboratory approach" is necessary
to decide that they are of like grade and quality.
Case analysis will reveal that the legacy of this "laboratory
approach" is uncertainty in the law of price discrimination and
unnecessary price rigidity. The test has not only been inefficacious
in producing criteria useful in legal planning; it has excluded from
consideration the evidence of the economic value of the commodities
involved. If brand differentiation creates substantially different
economic value the "laboratory approach" will not perceive it.
Yet if the Robinson-Patman Act was indeed intended to interdict
only unfair or unwarranted price differences, the economic value
of differently-priced commodities is a crucial consideration. The
assertion of the Attorney General's Committee that the function
of the "like grade and quality" criterion is to confine the operation
of the Act to comparable business transactions provides a key:
business transactions involve economic fact, not merely chemical
fact. If the Robinson-Patman Amendment is to function as an anti-
trust law, excluding unfair competition from the distribution system
of the economy, the effect on competition of price differences must
be brought into focus-and competition is viewed only in the
market place,9 not in the laboratory. Bearing in mind the hypo-
thesis that the "like grade and quality" standard should include
economic as well as physical comparison of commodities, a review
of the cases shows that the phrase has the capacity for this more
perceptive evaluation, and suggests that it may in part have played
this role unapprehended.
Physically Distinct Commodities
In cases where goods have been found to be of dissimilar grade
or quality, the distinguishing factors were the physical variations
of the product in question.'0 Unfortunately, the Commission's
peregrinations within the area of physically different products
leaves the analyst awash in uncertainty. In some early informal
proceedings, the Commission "recognized minor product variations
9 Beckman, "The Evolution of Marketing and Marketing Concepts," in Pro-
ceedings, Conference of Marketing Teachers From Far Western States 1, 3 (1958):
"The chief purpose in mentioning... [antitrust legislation] ... is to point out that all
of this is aimed largely at the regulation or control of business activity in the market
place... .
10 Cassady & Grether, "Like Grade and Quality," supra note 8, at 277: "There
is no question about the position of the Federal Trade Commission re the 'like grade
and quality' clause thus far-that the standard of similarity accepted by the Com-
mission is physical identity of the product." See id. at 244.
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to negative the statutory requirement of like grade and quality."'"
From this beginning the phrase has suffered what would seem to be
some irreconcilable interpretations, each decision purporting to
rest on a physical comparison test.
A district court decision of 1949, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Can Co.,12 serves as a reference point for evaluating ensuing
Commission decisions which appeared to ignore it. The court held
that two containers marketed by American, having appreciable,
though not substantial, physical differences were of like grade and
quality within the meaning of the act. The complainant, Bruce's
Juices, Inc., alleged competitive injury stemming from the higher
price it was charged for one size of can; American had refused to
sell it a different but equally serviceable can which American was
furnishing to Bruce's competitor at a lower price. In explanation of
the decision on the grade and quality issue, the court stated that
"the cans were all of commercial grade and quality and gave sub-
stantially identical performance." -1
The Commission was not quick to explore the possible implica-
tions of the Bruce's Juices decision, which held by implication that
important physical differences in a manufacturer's products would
not automatically exempt them from the proscription of price dis-
crimination. 4 In the Champion Spark Plug Co. case of 1953,'
insubstantial physical differences were the basis of the Commission's
decision that certain goods were not of like grade and quality.
Champion had sold a special brand of plug to Montgomery Ward
& Co., at a price lower than its Champion-branded number. The
difference between the two items involved only minor variations,
of unknown functional significance, in the insulator and "ribs." '6
11 81 Cong. Rec. App. 2336-39 (1937). In a case involving ladies' handbags, the
Commission held that "the merchandise in question was not, in fact, of the same
grade and quality. . .. It appeared to contain bags of various grades and qualities,
particularly with respect to market values." Id. at 2337. (Emphasis added.) In
another case, the commission felt that various handbags were not of like grade and
quality because some bore "the chain store's private brand or trade-mark and are
specially designed to match the shoes which it sells." Id. at 2339. Similarly, certain
ladies' hats were held to be of dissimilar grade and quality, one of the factors con-
sidered being that some of the hats were "slow-moving styles." Ibid. See Rowe,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 9-10.
12 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla.
1949), aff'd, 187 F2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951). Compare Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright
Co., 141 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1944).
13 87 F. Supp. at 987. Cf. McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F.
Supp. 456, 460-61 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
1- Compare Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934).
15 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
16 Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 67 & n.97 (1962).
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As in the informal handbag and millinery manufacturers' decisions
of 1937,17 all that is evident is that the fact of physical difference,
noticeable in a laboratory, created dissimilarity in the grade or
quality of these commodities.
The Commission began a perceptible drift from this attitude
in the 1955 decision in E. Edelmann c& Co.s The respondent, a
supplier of automobile replacement products, was charged with
selling its goods to small businessmen at less favorable prices than
to their large competitors. In rejecting respondent's protest that
certain of the goods sold to the larger accounts were not of a grade
or quality like those sold at higher prices, the hearing examiner
held that "the only differences were the brand name or mark,
stamped or lithographed, on the product, and the printed insert
in the hydrometer.... The floats are interchangeable, and appar-
ently there is no basic functional difference. The finding is that
these products were of substantially like grade and quality.' 9
Unlike the goods in the handbag and millinery manufacturers' cases
or the Champion Spark Plug case, the FTC saw these minimal
physical distinctions as too minute to effect a difference in the
grade or quality of these automotive parts. Again the Commission's
explanation was couched in terms of physical differences, the sig-
nifiance of which were not apparent.
If the Edelmann case revealed only a drift, the 1956 decision
in General Foods Corp. showed the Commission on a wholly new
heading. Respondent had been selling its institution pack Maxwell
House brand coffee to Institution Contract Wagon Distributors
at a lower price than it sold its grocery pack Maxwell House brand
to other wholesalers. It was held that what was apparently a
significant physical variation in the blend 2' did not render the
17 Supra note 11.
Is 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955).
19 51 F.T.C. at 983. This aspect of the case was later dismissed on the grounds
of lack of competitive injury. Id. at 985.
20 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956)
21 Id. at 800:
Institution coffee is blended to retain flavor and meet the aroma require-
ments of institution trade, and often is processed by respondent to meet the
taste of a specific institution or chef. Ordinarily respondent's Maxwell House
institution coffee is a blend of six different kinds of coffee beans, while the
grocery-pack formula calls for five kinds; the additional kind of bean in the
institution pack is to provide "staying" qualities in the coffee to insure longer
periods of freshness. There is some variance also in the roasting processes,
resulting in some difference between the two types of coffee in color and
taste. Maxwell House grocery-pack coffee is not always of identical blend,
and, of course, varies in grind.
Compare Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312,
319 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
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coffees of dissimilar grade or quality.22
Offering conclusions as rationale, the hearing examiner sug-
gested that differences in various coffee grinds, variances in roast-
ings of the same blends, and seasonal or other crop variations had
no relation to grade and quality; therefore, neither would the blend
variation here under analysis. 23 Significantly, however, a rationale
similar to that of Bruce's Juices was beginning to hold sway: the
General Foods opinion noted the fact that the differing blends
"can be and are sold for the same use, sometimes competitively. '24
The evidence of lack of market response to the blend variations
revealed their competitive equality. Although it seems likely that
the examiner was not impressed with the significance of this
facet of the evidence, this was a situation in which the commercial
standard supported and made cogent the FTC's position that
physically distinguishable goods were of like grade and quality.
Apparently mesmerized by the facility with which the Bruce's
Juices approach had swept the physically distinct products in
General Foods into its jurisdiction, the Commission delivered the
truly aberrational decision in Atalanta Trading Corp.2' The re-
spondent urged that it was not guilty of a section 2(d) violation
for granting promotional allowances on specially packaged ham
and on specially processed and packaged Canadian bacon. These
specialty items had each been sold only to a single purchaser; com-
petitors who had purchased other pork products from Atalanta
were not entitled to promotional allowances, it was argued, because
they had not purchased goods of grade or quality like the pro-
moted items.26 Blinking the fact that in General Foods, as in Bruce's
Juices, the actual ratio decidendi drew on the evidence that con-
sumers regarded the physically different goods as being of like
grade and quality,27 the hearing examiner resolved the question
through hypothesization. Focusing on the common source of bacon,
hams, and pork shoulder picnics, the initial decision announced
with astonishing temerity that "all of these products were pork,
22 52 F.T.C. at 817.
23 Id. at 816-17.
24 Id. at 817. See id. at 816 for testimony revealing that the coffees had sold
competitively. Bruce's Juices was not cited, but the rationale of that case was used
as a ground of decision. 52 F.T.C. at 817.
25 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956).
26 53 F.T.C. at 568.
27 Certainly this was so in Bruce's Juices, and it was also the case in General
Foods, despite the Commission's attempt to advance the "brand identity" presump-
tion. 52 F.T.C. 798, 817 (1956). The actual ground of decision was an admixture of
what the Commission viewed as insignificant physical distinctions and evidence of
consumer behavior; the "presumption" arguably appears as gratuitous dictum. Ibid.
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tand to t/he hearing examiner, ham is ham... ,,28
The exceptionable aspect of what has been characterized as the
"laboratory approach" is here apparent. The distinct commercial
identities of these various pork products in the view of the con-
sumer in the market place would seem so obvious as to warrant
judicial notice. 9 Yet by limiting his inquiry to physical comparison
in a commercially sterile "laboratory," the examiner remained un-
aware of the existence and competive significance of this fact.
In Bruce's Juices and General Foods, where goods having
appreciable physical differences were found to be of like grade
and quality, the decisions were tethered to evidence that consum-
ers regarded the commodities involved as being of equal value.
This is a fact infinitely more valuable to one attempting to evaluate
the effect on competition of a price difference between these prod-
ucts than a laboratory analysis of comparative composition. In
Atalanta, however, the examiner cast off these lines and pirated
the ship. Coveting the results of cases30 which had gathered
physically distinct goods within the boundaries of "like grade and
quality," he held that various pork products were of the required
jurisdictional similarity because, without reference to the market,
ham was ham."-
The Commission's decision was reversed by the court of ap-
peals3 2 While describing the function of section 2(d), the court
pinpointed the goal of the Robinson-Patman Amendment: "[T]he
customer's . . . sole concern is to be given an equal opportunity
with his competitors.... , If the act seeks to guarantee this op-
portunity by screening out unfair price differences, product dis-
tinctions having an effect on selling price must be considered. The
court further stated:
the test of products of like grade and quality was evolved to
prevent emasculation of the section by a supplier's making
artificial distinctions in his product but this does not mean that
all distinctions are to be disregarded.34
28 Atalanta Trading Corp., supra note 25, at 568. (Emphasis added.) The Com-
mission subsequently affirmed the initial decision in similar language. Id. at 571-72.
29 See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 n.5.
30 Again, Bruce's Juices was not cited; while General Foods was cited, it was
doubtlessly for the "brand identity" dictum. See note 27 supra.
31 53 F.T.C. at 568.
32 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), reversing 53
F.T.C. 565 (1956).
33 Id. at 370. (Emphasis added.)
31 Id. at 371. The court's footnote 5 reveals that price distinctions were among
those not to be disregarded.
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The Second Circuit's emphatic rebuke in Atalanta was ap-
parently not lost on the Commission. Recent decisions reveal a
comprehending implementation of the physical comparison test
of like grade and quality as modified by that court.3 5 In Universal-
Rundle Corp. 6 a manufacturer of plumbing fixtures was charged
with price discrimination for charging a lower price for the Homart
brand line it manufactured for Sears, Roebuck & Co. than that
charged to Sears' competitors for its own U-R brand line. The hear-
ing examiner found that there were significant differences in the
sizes of the fixtures in the two lines, and in the design and amount
of enameled surface. Witnesses testified that these differences
enhanced marketability, and that it was accepted practice in the
industry to vary price in accordance with such differences as existed
between the U-R and Homart lines." Upholding the examiner's
finding that these goods were not of like grade and quality, the
Commission rejected the complainant's contention that "physical
differences in products which affect consumer preference or market-
ability can.., be disregarded." 9
This decision was reaffirmed the following November in Quaker
Oats Co.40 Respondent was selling a special blend of oat flour,
run 14, to the Gerber Products Co. at a price lower than it sold
other oat flour to Gerber's competitiors. The hearing examiner had
held that the run 14 blend was of a grade and quality like respond-
ent's other blends, since Quaker "had not shown that the cost of
manufacturing run 14 was different from the cost of manufacturing
... other oat flour blends and that there are no objective stand-
ards for oat flour set up by government or business." 4' The record
revealed, however, that "run 14 had a substantially higher hull
content than other oat flour blends.., and was generally unaccept-
able except to Gerber." 4 Quoting Universal--Rundle, the Commis-
sion reversed the examiner, holding that "if there are substantial
35 However, Atalanta, escalating a dictum of General Foods, (see note 58
infra) rested in part on the Commission-created presumption of "like grade and
quality" accompanying products sharing brand identity. It is arguable that Atalanta
is best viewed as rejecting the ludicrous cross-elasticity seen by the Federal Trade
Commission and the "brand identity presumption." See 258 F2d at 370-71; Com-
ment, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 160, 170 (1961). But it seems more likely that the Atalanta
court also meant to require a consideration of market performance. See 258 F2d
at 371 & n.5.
30 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 16948 (FTC June 12, 1964).
37 Id. at 22004.
38 Ibid.
39 Id. at 22005.
40 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 17134 (FTC Nov. 18, 1964).
41 Id. at 22215.
42 Ibid.
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'physical differences in products which affect consumer preference
or marketability,' . . . such products are not of like grade and
quality . . . regardless of whether manufacturing costs are the
same .... -43 Clearly, a new factor has been included in the FTC's an-
nounced formula for evaluating grade and quality. While adhering to
the notion that only physically different goods can be of dissimilar
grade or quality, the Commission now agrees that at least in those
cases, the effect in the 'market of a physical variation will provide
the key to the issue of grade or quality.44
The Tribulations of Brands
The Federal Trade Commission has consistently maintained
its dichotomy between physical and brand variations: brand dif-
ferentiation of physically identical goods has not been seen to
create goods of dissimilar grade or quality.4 5 The genesis of this
doctrine appeared in the 1936 decision of Goodyear Tire c Rubber
Co.4" Goodyear had sold first-line tires to Sears, Roebuck bearing
the Sear's Allstate label, at a price lower than that charged to
Goodyear distributors for first-line tires bearing Goodyear's own
Allweather brand. Following a physical comparison test, the Com-
mission found the differently-branded tires to be of like grade and
quality.47 It discounted dealer testimony revealing the competitive
43 Ibid. Note that the Commission added the requirement of msbstantial physical
difference. It does not seem likely, however, that this will be allowed to become
the tail that wags the dog. If substantial consumer preference for one product having
insubstantial physical distinctions can be demonstrated, the Commission will almost
certainly yield on the grade or quality issue.
44 For a post-Atalanta court decision see Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden
Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill. 1960). It seems arguable that under
this new test, the change of labels on a package is a physical distinction which, if
responsible for demonstrable consumer preference, ought to render the goods of
dissimilar grade or quality. Cassady & Grether, "Like Grade and Quality," supra
note 8, at 264.
45 E.g., Fred Meyer, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, FTC Com-
plaints and Orders 1961-63 1[ 16368, at 21217 (FTC March 29, 1963); Baum, The
Robinson-Patman Act 13-14 (1964).
46 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
47 The respondent did not challenge on this issue, conceding that the tires sold
to Sears, Roebuck were "considered of comparable quality." 22 F.T.C. at 290. Counsel
apparently had little appreciation of the differentiating potential of the "like grade
and quality" standard, a notion further illustrated by the fact that the tires were
physically distinct in tread design. 22 F.T.C. at 255. Goodyear distributors testified
that Goodyear's "All Weather Non-skid Tread" brand was a physical characteristic
which was valued above the Sears tread features. 22 F.T.C. at 311. Consumer
preferences for a physical characteristic as well as for a brand name were dis-
regarded by the Commission, which clearly followed the notion that the two lines of
tires were comparable in a laboratory analysis of performance, and were therefore
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handicap of the Allstate tire as against the established nationally-
advertised Goodyear brand name;4" the Commission preferred a
laboratory test of grade and quality to a market test.
There followed in 1938 a similar decision in the case of Hansen
Inoculator Co." In that crucial case the respondent manufactured
a commercial legume inoculant which it sold under the Hansen
label to some purchasers at a higher price than that charged for
the same inoculant sold under private label to favored purchasers.
The Commission found the Hansen-branded product to be of a
grade and quality like the private brand. 50 The Commission did not
concern itself with whether or not there were commercially signifi-
cant distinctions between the two brands. The view in both Good-
year and Hansen was that goods which were physically comparable
and would yield like results in a laboratory analysis of composition
or performance were of like grade and quality within the meaning
of the act. Consequently, the effects of brand differentiation were
considered irrelevant.'
The Commission's position that brand variations could not
negate the similarity of grade and quality of physically comparable
goods was affirmed in the decision in United States Rubber Co.5 2
U.S. Rubber had sold tires to Montgomery Ward and Western
Auto, among others, at lower prices than those charged to smaller
customers for comparable tires bearing the nationally advertised
U.S. Royal brand.53 Without benefit of evidence bearing on the
commercial significance of the different brands, the Commission
concluded:
Said respondent has . . . sold ... special brand tires . . . at
prices different and lower than the prices charged and allowed
by it to other purchasers of its tires of like grade and quality
bearing its own brands. By so doing respondent has discrim-
inated in price .... 54
This same respondent was again found guilty of price discrim-
ination in the 1950 United States Rubber Co. decisionY5 Respon-
of like grade and quality within the meaning of the act. Cf. Universal-Rundle Corp.,
supra note 36; Quaker Oats Co., supra note 40. Compare this notion of comparable
utility with the handbag and millinery decisions discussed in note 11 supra.
48 22 F.T.C. at 311. National advertising expenditures amounted to $4,500,000
per year and $72 million during Goodyear's life as a tire manufacturer.
40 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).
50 Id. at 308.
51 See commentary on anonymity of the source in text to notes 143-45 infra.
52 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
53 Id. at 1500.
54 28 F.T.C. at 1500.
55 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950).
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dent had sold its brand name canvas footwear, Keds, at a price
higher than that charged for comparable private brand shoes. 6
Again without benefit of evidence of the commercial significance
of the brand distinction, the Commission found the differently-
branded shoes to be of like grade and quality because they were
physically similar.57
The 1956 decisions in Atalanta and General Foods involved
"branding" issues in addition to those considered earlier. To the
backlog of decisions clearly showing that, in the Commission's view,
brand differentiation of identical goods could not result in a vari-
ation in grade or quality, the Commission introduced a new criterion
of "like grade and quality" in General Foods:
The respondent has labeled the institution-pack and the grocery-
pack coffee here involved as Maxwell House coffee, 08s lending,
at least, the presumption that the two packs are of like grade and
quality. 59
This was, of course, nothing less than a staggering reversal of
form. Brand identity could in one situation create a presumption
of like grade and quality, while in another, brand differences could
have no role whatsoever as an indicium.60
As if the fallacy of this presumption were not immediately
patent, the notion was extended to the extreme ten months later
in the Atalanta affair.6' Citing General Foods, 2 the hearing exam-
iner concluded that the canned hams, pork shoulder picnics, and
Canadian bacon "were sold under respondent's brand name of
'Unox' and all were of 'like grade and quality.' "63 The Commission
56 46 F.T.C. at 1007.
57 46 F.T.C. at 1008. Apparently the Commission relied on the respondent's
practice of referring to both the nationally advertised and the unadvertised shoes as
"first grade and quality waterproof rubber footwear" in its discount schedules. Id.
at 1008-09. This emphasizes the Commission's insistence on the "laboratory test" of
grade and quality and its rejection of the market test. Cf. Fred Meyer, Inc., mpra
note 45, at 21217. "a supplier's use of identical descriptive data on invoices to
favored and non-favored customers . . . establishes, prima facie, the fact of like
grade and quality."
58 That the goods were physically distinct is beyond question. See note 21 supra.
The Commission had concluded that the grocery-pack and institution-pack coffees
were of like grade and quality because the coffees sold competitively. General Foods
Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 817, (1956). [author's footnote.]
59 General Foods Corp., supra note 20, at 817.
60 Rowe, op cit. mspra note 16, at 70-71.
61 Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956).
62 See note 58 mupra.
63 53 F.T.C. at 568.
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affirmed the decision in similar language.64 The doctrine was dis-
tinctly unpalatable and was overruled in the appeal to the Second
Circuit. 5 The court of appeals' decision at least resolved the in-
consistency of the brand identity presumption, but it is uncertain
what, if any, effect that court meant to lend to the Federal Trade
Commission's rejection of brand distinction of otherwise identical
goods as a criterion of like grade and quality.66
That the latter rule survived Atalanta intact in the Commis-
sion's view is certain. 7 In American Metal Products Co.6 the re-
spondent had been selling bathtubs to Crane bearing the latter
company's Crestmont brand at a lower price than that charged to
other purchasers of similar bathtubs carrying American Metal's
own brand. The initial decision held that since the Crestmont tubs
"were similar and comparable to like models under the [respon-
dent's] brand name of AllianceWare, differing only in the design
of apron affixed to them,"'6 the two lines of fixtures were of like
grade and quality. The Commission was not willing to recognize
the relevance of the commercial significance of a distinction in a
case where the difference was in brand alone. Perhaps it was thought
that the Second Circuit's Atalanta rationale could be confined to
cases involving physical differences resulting in commercially dis-
tinct products.
64 53 F.T.C. at 571.
65 Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), reversing 53
F.T.C. 565 (1956). See note 35 supra.
66 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 71-72, 74, for the view that Atalanta
presaged a test of grade and quality employing criteria other than physical factors.
Mr. Rowe notes the court's opinion that only artificial distinctions, not all distinctions,
are to be disregarded in deciding the issue. He suggests that this applies to
substantial brand variation of identical goods. This conclusion may well be warranted
by the Atalanta court's footnote recognizing the relevance of cross-elasticity, noting
that the various pork products were not competitive "price-wise.' Atalanta Trading
Corp. v. FTC, supra note 65, at 371 n.5. See supra note 35. However, it is arguable
that the court was referring only to physical distinctions which are either artificial
or substantial, the latter having an effect on consumer preference. See Universal-
Rundle Corp., supra note 36; Quaker Oats Co., supra note 40.
67 See Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Co., 307 F.2d 916 (5th
Cir. 1962), a post-Atalanta decision, and Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953).
Cf. a few of the post-A talanta Trade Practice Conference Rules: Optical Products
Industry, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. II 41192, at 43276-77 (June 30, 1962) ; Hosiery Industry,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 41152, at 43071 (Aug. 30, 1960, as amended June 1, 1964). But
cf. Mirror Industry, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. f 41118, at 42929-35 (June 30, 1962, as
amended May 16, 1963); Woodworking Machinery Industry, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
ff 41092 (June 24, 1960).
68 60 F.T.C. 1667 (1962).
69 Id. at 1679-80. The initial decision was subsequently vacated for mootness.
Id. at 1689.
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In the same year the Commission also handed down its de-
cision in Borden Co., 70 a case involving an ideal fact pattern for a
test of the FTC's resolve. The Commission did not flinch.
The Borden Case
The Borden Co. was charged with a section 2(a) violation for
selling evaporated milk under private label at a lower price than
that for which it offered its own Silver Cow brand evaporated milk.
The company conceded that the private label milk was chemically
identical to and was packed in the same method as the Silver Cow
brand milk. Borden asserted that despite the chemical identity
of the two brands, they were not of like grade and quality. The
foundation of this contention was that the Silver Cow brand label
enjoyed an intense public demand not shared by the private label.7 '
Adhering to its per se prohibition of brand differentiation, the
Commission flatly rejected the argument,72 stating, "We believe
it to be more reasonable ... to interpret the phrase so as not to
exclude the application of the Act in cases where the only distinc-
tion is in the label." 7 Respondent appealed, and in this, the first
case on the precise issue to reach a court of appeals,74 the Fifth
Circuit unequivocally reversed the Federal Trade Commission's
doctrine:
In determining whether products are of like grade and quality,
consideration should be given to all commercially significant
70 Borden Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, FTC Complaints and
Orders 1961-63 1 16191 (Nov. 28, 1962). It is certain that the FTC's physical
comparison test of grade and quality has not been much contested by the various
respondents who had solid cases for doing so. See Cassady & Grether, "Like Grade
and Quality," supra note 8, at 244 n.12. E.g., Goodyear conceded the issue of grade
and quality (see supra note 47) ; the U.S. Rubber Co did not challenge the Commis-
sion in its cases involving price differences on U.S. Royal tires, 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1503
(1939), and Keds, 46 F.T.C. 998, 1012-13 (1950), and the same products distributed
under private brand. See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 69-70. In 1957 it was
suggested that the Commission might not "be adamant if a case were properly
presented. It might even accept the market test. . . ." Cassady & Grether, "Like
Grade and Quality," supra at 277. Atalanta and Borden, however, showed this was
not to be the case.
71 Borden Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, FTC Complaints and
Orders 1961-63 f 16191, at 21017 (Nov. 28, 1962).
72 Id. at 12018-19.
73 Id. at 21018.
74 The opinion stated: "The basic issue presented here then is whether the
demonstrated consumer preference for the Borden brand product over the private
label product is to receive legal recognition in the 'like grade and quality' determin-
ation .... We find no case which controls our disposition of this issue." Borden
Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1964).
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distinctions which affect inarket value, whether they be physical
or promotional.75
The court was insisting that cases must be decided on the facts
of market performance76 rather than by laboratory analysis alone.77
Athwart the Commission's per se approach stood the Second Cir-
cuit's compelling declaration in Atalanta that the "like grade and
quality" standard was necessary to prevent artificial distinctions
from rendering the Act impotent, but that some distinctions could
not be disregarded.78 The court could ascertain from the record
that the FTC's notion that, as between the Silver Cow brand and
the private label, "the only distinction is in the label" would not
parse with the evidence.79 The testimony of various witnesses re-
vealed that the Borden brand label was of commercial significance
at each level of distribution:
As one wholesaler put it, "Private label merchandise is no good
for nobody unless there is a price on it .. .In the retail trade
as a whole they haven't been too much interested in [private
label evaporated milk] . .. frankly if it was the same price as
advertised or 15 cents or 25 cents a case under, it wouldn't sell,
they couldn't give it away. . . It has got to have $1.50 or $2
a case spread to make it interesting."0
The court could not ignore this compelling voice from the
market place. The Commission's physical analysis could establish
the chemical identity of Silver Cow and brand X, but not the com-
mercial virtuosity of the Borden brand. The market facts of the
commercial standard revealed the significantly higher economic
value of the Borden label resulting from consumer preference.
The Federal Trade Commission's monolithic refusal to yield
to a commercial standard of like grade and quality has been devas-
tated in the two appellate decisions in point. The Atalanta court
injected the commercial standard into the test of the grade and
quality of goods bearing physicial variations, and the Borden court
75 Id. at 137. (Emphasis added.)
76 Id. at 135-36. "The record clearly establishes that Borden brand evaporated
milk does command a higher price than private label milk at all levels of distribution.
Customers at the retail level are willing to pay more for it than for private label
because of the Borden name." (Emphasis added.)
77 Id. at 135: "Under the construction of the Act adopted . . .by the Commis-
sion the 'like grade and quality' determination was based solely on the physical
properties of the products without regard to the brand names they bear or the
relative public acceptance enjoyed by each." (Emphasis added.)
78 Id. at 138 & n.8.
79 Supra note 76.
80 339 F2d. at 136 n.3.
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completed the task by adding that standard to the "premium
brand" cases. However, while the Commission has apparently
acquiesced in the Second Circuit's Atalanta decision in the Uni-
versal-Rundle8' and Quaker Oats82 cases, more resistance to the
Borden decision may be anticipated.83
THE CASE FOR THE COMMERCIAL STANDARD
The "Meeting Competition" Cases
Illustrating how flexible has been the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's perception of "like grade and quality," the section 2(b)4
cases stand in sharp relief beside section 2(a) and 2(d) decisions. 5
Section 2 of the original Clayton Act contained an exemption for
meeting competition which was subsequently narrowed in the
Robinson-Patman Amendment to apply only where price differ-
ences were initiated to meet, but not beat, the equally low price
of an actual competitor."" The rationale of this provision is that the
lowering of prices to meet or to preserve competition is the very
business activity the antitrust laws should foster, not forbid. But
this baldly stated truism belies the complexity involved in im-
plementing the defense. The injunction against beating competition
inevitably raises the question of what goods are competitive at
what price: at what level does the price of product A meet or beat
the price of competing product B? A priori, the answer rests solely
with the consumer, and it is this fact that first invoked FTC cog-
nizance of the concept of the premium brand.
81 Supra note 36.
82 Supra note 40.
83 CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 186 (Feb. 8, 1965): The Commission re-
quested that the Solicitor General seek review in the Borden case and the appeal has
been recently filed. However, there is persuasive authority antedating the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision which contended for the commercial standard employed therein. E.g.,
Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 157-58 (1955) (minority position); Rowe,
Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act (1962); Cassady & Grether,
"Like Grade and Quality," 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241 (1957).
84 Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). One
proviso to this section establishes a defense for a manufacturer whose "lower
price ... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.....
85 For some relevant, tongue-in-cheek commentary, see Mason, "Discriminate
in Price Between Different Purchasers of Commodities of Like Grade, Quality and
Popularity," in An Antitrust Handbook 165, 17j-75 (1958).
86 49 Stat. 1526 § 2(b) (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). See Att'y Gen.
Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 179-80. Compare Federal Trade Commission, "Final
Report on the Chain-Store Investigation," S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at
90 (1935), with American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F2d 763 (7th Cir.
1930) and Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F2d
234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929). Compare Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne
Glove Co., 71 F2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934).
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In Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,8 7 the respondent
was charged with discriminating in price between different pur-
chasers of its automatic heating controls for heating plants. Being
unable to establish a successful cost justification for the lower
prices, the respondent asserted that these low prices were granted
to certain large purchasers to meet the even lower prices of com-
peting manufacturers.88 The Commission rejected the defense: "re-
spondent has developed a large customer demand for, and public
acceptance of, its controls, and has been able consistently to sell
them at prices higher than those charged by its competitors." 8
And further:
When price differentials ... reach a point where they cannot bejustified by cost differences, it is unsound and inconsistent to
urge that they then become prices which have been made in good
faith to meet the equally low or lower prices of competitors
simply because they may not be lower than competitors' prices.
To accept this proposition would mean that any seller of a
commodity which generally sells at a premium price may freely dis-
criminate among its customers so long as it does not undercut the
prices of competitors. Such an interpretation would make the act
largely unworkable. .... 90
The premium product rationale of Minneapolis-Honeywell was
made more emphatic in the Standard Oil Co.91 decision of 1953.
Respondent asserted that lower gasoline prices offered certain cus-
tomers were granted to meet competition. The Commission noted
that one of the prices Standard Oil was "meeting" was "on Fleet
Wing gasoline which ... was not a major brand of gasoline. In the
trade sense, it was an off brand and generally sold at prices lower
than major brands of gasoline.19 2 This was crucial to the Commis-
sion's decision to reject respondent's defense, for the opinion states:
There was no evidence as to whether or not Fleet Wing gasoline
was of comparable grade and quality with respondent's gasoline.
Regardless of this, in the retail distribution of gasoline public
acceptance rather than chemical analysis of the product is the
important competitive factor.93
The concept was reiterated in matter-of-fact fashion in the
87 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
88 44 F.T.C. at 396.
89 Ibid.
90 Id. at 396-97. (Emphasis added.)
91 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953).
92 Id. at 952.
93 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Note that the Commission apparently viewed this
issue as being divorced from the "like grade and quality" issue.
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Commission's opinion in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. " Respondent had
lowered its price on its premium beer in the St. Louis area with
competitive success. Rejecting the proffered defense of meeting
competition, the Commission offered the same objection:
It is evident that Budweiser could and did successfully command
a premium price in the St. Louis market .... The test in such
a case is not necessarily a difference in quality but the fact that
the public is willing to buy the product at a higher price in a
normal market.95
Again in the 1964 decision in Callaway Mills 9 the Commission
rejected a seller's "meeting competition" defense, declaring that:
Both the courts and the Commission have consistently denied the
shelter of the [meeting competition] defense to sellers whose
product, because of intrinsic superior quality or intense public
demand, normally commands a price higher than that usually
received by sellers of competitive goods.9 7
The consistent theme of these cases has been that a mere
comparison of the prices of the products of the respondent and his
competitor is meaningless. Although not expressly included in sec-
tion 2(b), the Commission and the courts have found it necessary
to import a "like grade and quality" comparison of competing
goods into that section; and the results of that comparison have
been grounded on the facts of consumer preference. The Commis-
sion, it seems, would live in the best of all possible worlds. In
the section 2(a) and section 2(d) cases it has insisted that mere
brand differentiation of a single manufacturer's products could
not effect a change in grade or quality. Yet in the section 2(b)
cases, the Commission insists that the products of competing manu-
facturers must be compared by the same commercial standard it
would otherwise reject to ascertain whether a price adjustment
meets or beats competition." In the section 2(b) cases, the fact
94 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd and re-
inanded to court of appeals, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), FTC again rev'd, 289 F.2d 835
(7th Cir. 1961).
95 Id. at 302. (Emphasis added.) See 58 Colum. L. Rev. 567 (1958) ; 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1367 (1958).
96 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16800 (FTC Feb. 10, 1964).
97 Id. at 21755. (Emphasis added.) The Commission has placed on the seller the
burden of establishing that his price reductions do no more than meet competition,
e.g., Callaway Mills, supra at 21755; Cabin Crafts, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16802,
at 21774 (FTC Feb. 10, 1964).
98 The majority of the Attorney General's Committee was guilty of the in-
consistency; after approving the FTC's method of treating the issue of "like grade
and quality" in the § 2(a) cases, it also approved the "premium brand doctrine" in
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that competitors' products may be as physically fungible as gaso-
lines 99 is irrelevant for meeting competition purposes; 100 the con-
sumer's preference for a brand is the crucial factor;' 01 otherwise
the act would be "largely unworkable."' 0 2
Unquestionably the Commission is correct when it decides the
issue of "like grade and quality" in the section 2(b) cases on the
evidence of a market test. If it be demonstrated that a substantial
number of consumers purchase Standard Oil gasoline in preference
to Fleet Wing if the products are offered at the same price, regard-
less of chemical similarity, the two brands are not of competitive
like grade and quality. The inconsistency of the Commission's
position is clear, however, for the same rationale is equally appli-
cable in the section 2 (a) or section 2 (d) cases. When Borden placed
the same milk under a Silver Cow label and a private label, the
market test revealed substantial consumer preference for the Bor-
den brand. Yet the Commission refused to countenance in a section
2(a) situation the same test of grade and quality it had adopted in
the meeting competion cases. The Fifth Circuit rebuked the FTC
for its inconsistent rejection of its own precedents, 10 3 declaring that:
if... [the consumers' preference] ... is appropriate in consider-
ing the grade and quality of products for purposes of Section 2(b),
it is equally applicable to that determination under Section 2(a).
We cannot approve of the Commission's construing the Act in-
consistently from one case to the next, as appears most advan-
tageous to its position in a particular case. 04
the "meeting competition" cases: "[T]he seller of the premium product sometimes
must not go down to the price level of the lesser product." Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm.
Antitrust Rep. 184 (1955). Correctly fingering the proper issue of the "meeting
competition" defense, and indeed the proper issue of the Robinson-Patman Amend-
ment, the Committee focused on the competition in the market: "In each case, the
heart of the matter is whether actual competition, not merely a nominal price quota-
tion, is equalized ...." Ibid.
99 See Standard Oil Co., supra note 91.
100 See text at note 93 supra.
101 For a court's adopting this test, see Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life
Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Plaintiff alleged that defendant's
adjustment of its price to the same as plaintiff's constituted beating competition.
Plaintiff's argument was that defendant's product enjoyed greater consumer prefer-
ence because it was packed in glass while plaintiff's was packed in tin. The court
declared that the "crucial issue ... hinges on whether defendant's product is a
premium product," id. at 921. "The ultimate test . . .is a greater price for the glass
contained product." Id. at 922. The affidavits indicated such was not the case and
plaintiff was denied relief, id. at 921-22.
102 See text at note 90 supra.
103 See Kalinowski, "Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects," in 17 A.B.A.
Section of Antitrust L. Proceedings 360, 379-80 (1960).
104 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 139 (5th Cir. 1964). The § 2(b) cases
do not stand alone as precedent for legal cognizance of the value of a brand name.
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Thte Anticompetitive Effect
In some industries heavy national advertising and sales pro-
motion have cultivated significant consumer preferences in a
brand-conscious American public. Particularly on commodities
for resale . . . resale value and mobility is an aspect of "grade
and quality." For commodities containing precisely identical in-
gredients packaged under a distinctive mark or label may not
command equal consumer acceptance. Nationally advertised
"premium" goods are "competitive" with unknown entities or
"economy" brands only at a significant margin in price ...
A price discrimination law can consider heavily advertised and
anonymous or private-brand merchandise on an equal legal foot-
ing only at a serious distortion of economic facts.10 5
Borden and the section 2(b) cases have rested on this thesis.
Regardless of physical similarity or functional interchangeability,
competing goods are simply not of like grade and quality if the con-
sumer will not pay the same price for them." 6 In fact, they are not
Consider the substantial bodies of law dealing with: secondary meaning, see Stem &
Grossman, "Public Injury and the Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law
of Unfair Competition," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935 (1962) ; trademarks, see Schroeter,
"Trademarks and Marketing," 48 Trademark Rep. 783 (1958) ; fair trade, see Fulda,
"Resale Price Maintenance," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175, 184-85 (1954).
105 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 158 (1955) (minority view).
106 It is clear that consumer preference has become an element in the deter-
mination of the "relevant product market" in antitrust suits under the Sherman Act
and § 7 of the Clayton Act. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956) (The Cellophane Case), it was found that du Pont did not
have monopoly power in the relevant product market. This determination rested on
the finding that du Pont's product, cellophane, constituted less than 207 of the
flexible packaging material market, which included glassine, waxed paper, foil, and
pliofilm. 351 U.S. at 399-400. Crucial to the Court's decision was the finding that
there was not only reasonable interchangeability among these competing products,
but a responsive interchangeability: if the purchasers of flexible wrappings would
switch from one product to the other in concert with price fluctuations, "the products
compete in the same market." 351 U.S. at 400. The record from the lower court sus-
tained the finding "that the '[g]reat sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging
markets to price or quality changes' prevented du Pont from possessing monopoly
control over price." Ibid. Consumer behavior, then, was the key to the boundaries of
the relevant product market.
Although the Court was less specific, a similar analysis seems to be the heart
of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (the
du Pont-General Motors case). In the § 7 case, du Pont argued that it did not occupy
a monopoly position in the relevant product market, basing its argument on statistics
showing that it supplied General Motors with only 3.5% of finishes sold to industrial
users and 1.6% of the total market for the type of fabric used in the auto industry.
The Court found the relevant product market to be drastically narrower than "all
industrial users" or "the automobile industry," however, basing its determination on
the fact that the record showed "that automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficient
peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from
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all other finishes and fabrics to make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of
the Clayton Act." 353 U.S. at 593-94. The reasonable translation of this would seem
to be that the Court saw no significant responsive interchangeability among the
du Pont finishes and fabrics and those used by all industrial consumers. Therefore.
"the bounds of the relevant market... are not coextensive with the total market for
finishes and fabrics, but are coextensive with the automobile industry, the relevant
market for finishes and fabrics." In this narrower relevant product market, du Pont
did have sufficient market power to pose its General Motors holdings as a restraint
of commerce. Despite possible reasonable or functional interchangeability of products
used by all of industry, it was the lack of responsive interchangeability among the auto
manufacturers, i.e., the inelasticity of consumer demand, which defined these narrower
boundaries. As in Cellophane, it was consumer behavior which provided the key to
the relevant product market. Similarly, in International Boxing Club v. United States,
358 U.S. 242 (1959), the facts of consumer preference again controlled in defining
the relevant product market. The Court affirmed the lower court's finding that
championship and nonchampionship bouts were distinct markets, basing the ruling on
the facts that average revenue from championship bouts was $154,000 compared to
$40,000 for nonchampionship fights; television rights for championship bouts netted
an average of $100,000 compared to $45,000 for nonchampionship; Nielson ratings for
the championship broadcasts were 74.9% contrasted to 57.7% for the other bouts;
and that "spectators pay 'substantially more' for tickets to championship fights than
for nontitle fights." 358 U.S. at 250-51. (Emphasis added.)
The same pattern followed in the case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962). In evaluating the vertical aspects of the merger involved, the Court
determined the relevant product market, not according to mere reasonable inter-
changeability, but according to responsive interchangeability. Focusing on the various
"product's peculiar characteristics and uses . . . distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes . .. , 370 U.S. at 325, the Court found the relevant market
to consist of men's, women's, and children's shoes. "These product lines are recog-
nized by the public ... each has characteristics peculiar to itself rendering it gener-
ally noncompetitive with the others; and each is, of course, directed toward a distinct
class of customers." 370 U.S. at 326. The same analysis was used in defining the
relevant product market in the horizontal aspects of the merger. 370 U.S. at 336.
The District of Columbia Circuit reached a decision determined by the same
formula in Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Reynolds
argued for a broad relevant market including various foils which were reasonably
interchangeable with the product manufactured by its new acquisition. The court found
a narrower market consisting of florist foil, however, based on evidence that florist
foil brought a lower price, and that other consumers of the comparable higher-price
varieties of foil had not responded to the price advantage. 309 F.2d at 228-29.
The same approach is discernible in the recent case of United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). In delineating the relevant product market, the
Supreme Court separated insulated aluminum cable from insulated copper cable,
thereby narrowing the market and ultimately resulting in the finding that Alcoa had
effected a merger with Rome Cable Corporation in violation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Court based its decision on facts showing that, although the two types of
cable were reasonably interchangeable and did even compete to some degree, the
insulated aluminum cable was rapidly displacing the copper counterpart for use in
overhead distribution lines. Insulated aluminum cable constituted only 6.5% of gross
additions to overhead lines in 1950 but had risen to 77.2% by 1959. 377 U.S. at 274.
Insulated copper cable, on the other hand, dominated the underground cable field, 377
U.S. at 276, apparently because insulated aluminum cable was physically too inferior
for that use. 377 U.S. at 277. There was, then, little responsive interchangeability in
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competitive 0 7 at the same price, 0  and to the merchant as well
as the consumer, they are different products. 10 9 If one accepts the
the underground cable market, though both products were reasonably interchangeable.
In the overhead cable market, there was little responsive interchangeability because
"the price of most insulated aluminum conductors is indeed only 50% to 65% of the
price of their copper counterparts; and the comparative installed costs are also gen-
erally less." 377 U.S. at 276. Consumer preference, then, again was the key to the
boundaries of the relevant product market.
In Continental Can Co. v. United States, 378 U.S. 441 (1964), the most recent
Supreme Court decision defining a relevant market, the Court specifically rested its
determination on the facts of consumer behavior. In deciding that metal and glass
containers for beer might constitute a single relevant product market, the court noted:
Thus, though the interchangeability of use may not be so complete and the
cross-elasticity of demand not so immediate as in the case of most intra-
industry mergers, there is over the long run the kind of customer response
to innovation and other competitive stimuli that brings the competition
between these two industries within § 7's competition-preserving proscriptions.
378 U.S. at 455. (Emphasis added.) See 378 U.S. at 453-58. Over a period of time,
then, the Court felt that there was a significant responsive interchangeability between
metal and glass beer containers.
The problems of delineating the relevant market are plainly analogous to those
involved in the issue of "like grade and quality." In both situations the effort should
be made to discover what products are in fact so similar that they do compete; in
both the search should be for actual competition, not merely for the "reasonable" or
"functional" interchangeability of competing goods as determined by a laboratory
analysis of composition or performance; and in both it is the evidence of consumer
behavior in the marketplace which can supply the answer to the question of actual
competition. Cf. Comment, "Determination of the Relevant Product Market," 26
Ohio St. L.J. 241 (1965).
107 See text at notes 4-8 supra.
108 Many factors may influence the consumer's decisions. See, e.g., King, "Private
Lables Often Harder to Sell than Established National Brands," Advertising Age,
July 9, 1962, p. 84: "In spite of the fact that private label instant coffee is an old
established item with most retailers . . . it . . . generally sells at a retail price well
below the national brand ......
109 Chamberlain, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 56 (8th ed. 1962):
A general class of product is differentiated if any significant basis exists for
distinguishing the goods ... of one seller from those of another. Such a basis
may be real or fancied, so long as it is of any importance whatever to
buyers, and leads to a preference for one variety of the product over another.
Where such differentiation exists, even though it be slight, buyers will be
paired with sellers, not by chance and at random . . . but according to their
preference.
Differentiation may be based upon certain characteristics of the product itself,
such as exclusive patented features; trade names; peculiarities of the package
or container, if any; or singularity in quality, design, color, or style. ...
Insofar as these and other intangible factors vary from seller to seller, the
"product" in each case is different, for buyers take them into account, more
or less, and may be regarded as purchasing them along with the commodity
itself.
Consider the Borden case; surely in the minds of most consumers the Silver
Cow milk was as different from the same milk under private label as from the
milk distributed by Borden's competitors.
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postulate that the Robinson-Patman Act is directed only at unfair
competition, it should follow as a corollary that charging a dis-
tributor a higher price for a nationally branded item is not unfair
in the price discrimination sense, if it can be demonstrated that it
will bring a higher price on resale than its private-brand counter-
part.110
The selling power of the national brand is an accepted fact
of business life."' The reasons for this are multifarious, and include
the consumer's familiarity with a brand name, his convictions of
its reliability or quality, and his psychological response to a
brand.112 The business world has responded to this phenomenon
through product differentiation, accomplished through labelling
variations 13 as well as through advertising and packaging and
physical innovations." 4
110 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 83, at 72-73.
111 See, e.g., Peckham, "The Consumer Speaks," J. Marketing, October 1963,
p. 21. This article analyzes the results of a Nielson survey of supermarket shoppers.
The consumer's predilection not only for brands, but for a particular brand, is illus-
trated by a graph, id. at 23, showing the percentage of consumers refusing to buy
substitute products when the brand desired was unavailable. The shoppers were
questioned on fourteen product classifications, and the percentage of those who would
rather fight than switch ranged from 67% for dentifrice to 29% for tissue. Other
figures showed the consumer adhering to his brand despite unavailability of desired
size, id. at 23, or color, id. at 24. Legal significance: the survey may be too narrow
in scope to be a ground of decision, but it reveals that to the consumer one brand
is not matched in grade or quality by any other in the market. Cf. Masen, "A Few
Consumers Speak," J. Marketing, April 1964, p. 68. See also Cassady & Grether,
"Like Grade and Quality," 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 256-63 (1957); Peckham,
"Speaking of Consumers," 3. Marketing, April 1964, p. 70. The FTC has long been
aware of the selling power of a national brand: "The wider margin per unit in the
private-brand items does not necessarily mean a higher total dollar net profit than
on competing standard brands because of differences in the turnover of the two."
Federal Trade Commission, "Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation," S. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1935).
112 Herzog, "Behavioral Science Concepts for Analyzing the Consumer," in
Proceedings, Conference of Marketing Teachers 32, 37-41 (1958). See generally
Chamberlain. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 56-71, 130, 133 (8th ed. 1962).
About half of the housewives interviewed in a pilot study comparing national
and private brands conducted for Good Housekeeping believed private labels sell for
less because they are "not as good in quality." The percentage of interviewers so
convinced varied erratically according to the product categories, which ranged from
appliances to canned foods. "Mom Feels Quality, Not Ad Cost, Makes Brand Item
Costlier," Advertising Age, Dec. 7, 1964, p. 30.
113 E.g., the Borden Company's practice with its evaporated milk.
114 See Howard, Legal Aspects of Marketing 55-56 (1964); Blumenthal, "How
Brand Names Defend and Advance," in Shultz & Mazze, Marketing in Action 241
(1963).
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Consider that the market for a given item is segmented;1 5 for
example, there is a limit to the number of consumers who can or
will afford the premium-priced, Borden-labeled Silver Cow milk.
The market for less expensive private-label milk exists apart from
the premium market. The non-Borden products in the private label
market may well be the equal of Silver Cow in chemical properties
and quality, yet will sell at a lower price because of lesser consumer
demand. The Federal Trade Commission's laboratory approach
would shackle Borden with one price for all the milk it produces of
chemical identity. This would preclude Borden from entering the
competition of the various market segments, forcing it to compete
in only one of the several markets and effectively stifling competi-
tion by preventing a competitor from entering a distinct market.
This, of course, is an incongruous effect for an antitrust law." 6
Conversely, recognition of the commercial difference between Silver
Cow and the same milk under a non-premium label promotes over-
all competition. If the two are recognized as being of unlike grade
or quality," 7 Borden may then engage in product differentia-
tion. 8 The Silver Cow brand remains competitive in the premium
brand market and the off-brand becomes a new entry in the private
brand sector.
THE "EMASCULATION" ARGUMENT
The argument is made that the legislative history of the Rob-
inson-Patman Amendment clearly reveals that brand distinctions
were to be disregarded in deciding the issues of grade and qual-
115 See Beckman, Maynard & Davidson, Principles of Marketing 611 (6th ed.
1957).
116 Rowe, "Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under
the Robinson-Patman Act," 66 Yale L.J. 1, 30-35 (1956).
117 The commercial difference should perhaps be treated as creating a difference
in grade. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 83, at 76. A difference in grade or quality of the
products exempts the transaction from FTC jurisdiction.
118 Perhaps there is something undesirable in allowing the consumer to be
induced to pay more for the premium priced Silver Cow milk when the same milk is
on a lower shelf at a lower price. Perhaps this doubt underlies the Federal Trade
Commission's doctrine. It seems indisputable, however, that this is not the sort of
problem with which the Robinson-Patman Act is geared to cope. Its target is the
protection of competition in the distribution system; its administrators should there-
fore focus on the realities of the market-the place where competition exists. Certain
of the processes which create consumer demand may be deplored but the fact of
demand for a premium brand should not be ignored.
Further, it is at least doubtful that the spur to the economy wrought by product
differentiation is really over-balanced by the questionable immorality of the "seduc-
tion of the consumer." See Rowe, "Price Differentials and Product Differentiation:
The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act," 66 Yale L.J. 1, 27 (1956).
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ity.'" A proposal was made to amend section 2(a) to make it
applicable only to price discrimination between commodities of
like grade, quality, and brand. 20 Commenting on the proposal, the
draftsman of the act asserted:
The proposal, although it may seem harmless at first sight, is
a specious suggestion that would destroy the efficacy of the bill
against larger buyers. So amended, the bill would impose no
limitations whatever upon price differentials, except as between
different purchasers of the same brand . . . and to so amend the
bill would leave every manufacturer free to put up his standard
goods under a private brand for a particular purchaser and give
him any price discount or discrimination that he might demand.121
What the speaker envisioned was a manufacturer's creating
insignificant label or package variations for every customer, with
different prices proportionally responsive to the customer's pur-
chasing power attending each variety. The amendment would in-
deed have allowed the evil he perceived; commercially insignificant
differentiation ought not to sanction price differences. To extra-
polate from this the conclusion that commercially significant vari-
ations should also be disregarded is unwarranted. 22 Neither the
advocates of the commercial standard nor the Borden opinion pro-
119 E.g., Brief for Respondent, p. 13, Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1964); Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 31 (1959): "[I]t is evident
that the wording was carefully chosen to prevent price concessions to large distribu-
tors who sold commodities under their own private brands." See Patman, Complete
Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 23, 35 (1963); Seidman, Price Discrimination
Cases," in Hoffman & Wingard, Hoffman's Antitrust Law and Techniques 409, 424-28
(1963).
120 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary
on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (1936). Similarly, a
proposal to amend the act to read "like grade, quality, and design" was rejected.
80 Cong. Rec. 8234-35 (1936) : "[I]f the word design is inserted . . . the door will
be open to a situation in which this bill may be flouted and the purposes of the
bill destroyed."
121 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary
on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 469 (1936).
122 Rowe, op. cit. supra note 83, at 65:
The net of the legislative history was this: rejection of proposals to set up
"likeness" in brand or design as an additional statutory prerequisite signified
that no blanket exemption was contemplated for "like" products which dif-
fered only in brand or design, leaving open the application of the Act to
differentiated products reflecting more than a nominal or superficial varia-
tion.
See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 19-21, Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964),
Cassady & Grether, "Like Grade and Quality," supra note 111, at 272-73.
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pose an exemption for the triflng frill; rather, the heart of the
argument is that it disfavors economic fact to ignore the significant
variations. While a manufacturer might place numerous labels on
the same item, it is unlikely that any but his house brand will
evince a distinct consumer response. His own brand, e.g., Silver
Cow, may command a higher price than his commercially imper-
ceptible "brand X", but his "brand Y" and "brand Z" will generally
suffer the same relative anonymity, and he will not be able to
evidence consumer response to these off-brands substantial enough
to warrant price differences between them.123 The spectre of emascu-
lation through the use of a plethora of inconsequential brands is
fanciful, not real. The adoption of the commercial standard does
not bear that as a concomitant.' 2 The act continues to be effective
against its proper target: unfair or unwarranted price differences
to different purchasers of goods of equal commercial value.
The Cases in a New Perspective
Charting the old cases with the new commercial standard as a
pole star offers further insight into the emasculation argument. Pre-
sumably if the act would be nullified by a market test, the past
cases would have had some opposite and undesirable results. Such is
not clearly the case, however. Instead, application of considerations
implicit in the commercial standard appears to lend some consist-
ency to what hitherto seemed the aimless course of the decisions.
Consider the cases previously discussed which dealt with goods
having physical variations. 25 It was impossible under the FTC's
"laboratory approach" to glean meaningful or useful criteria for
determining "like grade and quality" from the language of the
opinions. Yet the millinery and handbag cases of 1937 seem clearly
to be correct decisions under a commercial standard if the almost
certain differences in consumer preferences for the various styles are
to be inferred. 28
123 See Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F2d 916 (5th
Cir. 1962).
124 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1964); Rowe, op. cit.
supra note 83, at 65, 75-76; Cassady & Grether, "Like Grade and Quality," supra note
111, at 266-67, 272-73; Rowe, "Price Differentials," supra note 116, at 15. For confu-
sion concerning the operation of the commercial standard, see Select Comm. on Small
Business, "Price Discrimination, The Robinson-Patman Act, and the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws," H.R. Rep. No. 2966, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 98-99 (1956) ; Dam, "Economics and Law of Price Discrimination,"
31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1963).
125 See text at notes 11-44 supra.
126 See note 11 supra.
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The language of Bruce's Juices,127 of course, left no doubt that
that court applied a commercial test to determine that physically
different cans were of like grade and quality.128 Yet the ensuing
Commission decision in E. Edelmann29 was prima facie at odds
with Bruce's Juices, for instead of examining the commercial sig-
nificance of the variations of the automotive parts, the opinion
spoke in terms of the similar physical characteristics of the products
while deciding that they were of like grade and quality. 30 As in the
1937 cases, however, a commercial test would inferably have yielded
the same result. There was no evidence, nor any reason to suspect,
that the minor physical variations in the auto parts had any effect
on consumer demand.
Similarly, the language of the General Foods decision 1'1 leaves
one despairing of finding any consistency in the chain of cases. How-
ever, if the fiction of "brand identity" 132 is ignored and focus is
directed to the testimony indicating that the blend variations of
the Maxwell House coffee were insignificant to the customers, 13 3
the consistency is apparent: a market test again would yield the
same result.
The Commission's ruling in Atalanta34 was unsound by any
rationale, but the Second Circuit, of course, used the language of
a commercial standard in reversing the Commission. 8 Following
Atalanta, the Commission's decisions in Universal-Rundle36 and
Quaker Oats'37 indisputably adopted the commercial standard as
a formula for evaluating the grade and quality of physically distinct
variations of a product. 38 In such cases, the Commission had previ-
ously attempted to mold the language of their opinions around a
laboratory approach; but the commercial standard, openly em-
ployed by the courts in Bruce's Juices and Atalanta, seems also to be
the unmentioned concordancer of the Commission's pre-Universal-
127 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), nodi-
fled, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
128 See text at note 13 supra.
129 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955).
130 See text at notes 18-19 supra.
131 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
132 See text at notes 58-60 supra.
133 General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 816 (1956).
134 Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956), set aside, 258 F2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1958).
13,; See 258 F.2d 365, 371 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1958).
136 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16948 (FTC June 23, 1964).
'37 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 17134 (FTC Nov. 25, 1964).
138 See text at note 44 supra.
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Rundle decisions. The emasculation argument, then, draws little
strength in this quarter.
Unlike the cases involving physically different products, in
those dealing with brand-differentiated products the commercial
standard would alter some of the results, which after all have here-
tofore been uniform. Yet where some of the past decisions seem
unpalatable, the reason for that appears more clearly in the light
of a market test.
It is arguable that application of the market test in the Good-
year Tire & Rubber case 139 would yield no different result. Given
the low price, the Allstate tire was an unusually strong competitor
for an off-brand tire.140 The opinion reveals that Sears, Roebuck
invested in an extensive advertising program promoting the All-
state brand.141 The permissible inference is that this promotion was
successful in creating a consumer demand for the Allstate tire not
substantially different from that enjoyed by the Goodyear brand.
Further augering against Goodyear's argument under a commercial
standard is the fact that Sears advertised the source of its tires as
"the leading tire manufacturer," or "the world's foremost tire manu-
facturer." 142 This sort of information ought to neutralize to a notic-
able extent consumer predilection for a premium-branded, premium-
priced tire. If the rationale of the market test is that the realities
of consumer preferences must be recognized, it follows that factors
affecting that preference cannot be overlooked. At least a part of a
consumer's brand preference stems from his conviction about the
quality or reliability of the familiar product or its maker, as op-
posed to the anonymity of the off brand. If Sears undertakes to
inform its customers that the Allstate brand is "off" in name alone
and is actually the product of the "foremost tire manufacturer,"
resistance to the Allstate tire should be mimized, along with Good-
year's contention that the Allstate tire is not of a commercial grade
or quality like that of its own brand.
The facts of the Hansen Inoculator case143 were similar. Al-
though there was no evidence of the degree of consumer preference
139 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
140 See "Do Car Accessories Sell by Brand?" Printers' Ink, Feb. 28, 1964,
p. 48. Consumers specified brand in impressive percentages for antifreeze (54%),
tires (52%), and batteries (31%).
141 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra note 139, at 295:
Sears, Roebuck & Co. adopted a plan of very extensive consumer advertising
of its goods . . . and in its advertising campaign, made its tires a leading
feature in advertisements in millions of catalogues, national magazines and
the leading daily newspapers throughout the United States, featuring the high
quality of its new tire and the low price....
142 22 F.T.C. at 295, but see the Goodyear-Sears contracts, id. at 254, 260, 267.
143 26 F.T.C. 303 (1936).
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for the Hansen label, the packaging practice of the purchaser of
the private label inoculant was tantamount to trading on Hansen's
name. The private brand purchaser identified the source of its
product by advertising it as being "made for us under our own
label, by a reliable manufacturer at Urbana, Illinois,' 1 44 the loca-
tion of the Hansen firm. Further blurring any real distinction be-
tween the Hansen and the private brand, the two labels were found
to "resemble each other having green borders and background of
leguminous plants and similar language.' 14 The identification of
the source was so specific and the labels so similar as to obliterate
any vestige of separate identities, even to the least astute consumer.
There could be no basis for finding the goods so marketed to be
of differing grade or quality under a commercial standard, for the
anonymity of the source had been breached.
Perhaps the two U.S. Rubber Co.140 cases would have had
different results under the market test. There is nothing in the
report of either case indicating that the favored purchasers were
guilty of the abuses found in Goodyear or Hansen, and there is the
likelihood that the U.S. Rubber Co. brands were premium products
enjoying significant consumer demand. If the commercial test would
reverse the decisions in these cases, it is hardly accurate to assert
that the act is thereby eviscerated; it is more likely that the actual
results were unwarranted.
The "brand identity" presumption introduced in General Foods
and Atalanta is enlightening when considered from the market
standpoint. The Commission almost certainly conceived this notion
in response to the economic reality that the Maxwell House and
Unox brand names had selling power. Perhaps the result in General
Foods is acceptable because it accords with the market facts. But
in evaluating Atalanta it must be remembered that this was a sec-
tion 2(d) case,147 wherein the Commission was concerned with ad-
vertising allowances. Assuming demonstrable consumer predisposi-
tion for Unox products, the FTC was faced with a dilemma: unless
all Unox pork products were of like grade and quality, the Atalanta
Trading Co. could legally grant advertising allowances on the
physically distinct items sold only to the favored purchasers, while
granting no allowances to other Unox customers. The galling sig-
nificance to the FTC lay in the arguable notion that the advertise-
ment of a single Unox product alerts consumers that the entire
144 26 F.T.C. at 309.
145 Id. at 308.
146 United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) ; United States Rubber Co.,
28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
147 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958).
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Unox line is available at a certain store. 48 The relevance of the
presumption created by the FTC is that, when evaluating grade
and quality in another setting, the FTC was led to recognition of
the significance of the market performance of a brand name, just
as it had been in the section 2(b) cases.149
In both the brand- and physically-differentiated product situ-
ations, the commercial standard appears innocent of the crime of
emasculation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Moreover, in the phys-
ical comparison cases, that standard looks suspiciously like the silent
ratio decidendi.
Grade v. Quality
The criticism thrust upon the FTC has been directed at its
exclusive use of the "laboratory approach" in resolving the issue
of "like grade and quality." The effort has been made to demon-
strate that a commercial standard must also be invoked to evaluate
intelligently the commercial similarity of commodities. It would,
however, be equally unsatisfactory to use the commercial standard
as the exclusive criterion. A crude illustration is the fact that an
affluent society enjoys a significant amount of discretionary wealth
to invest in luxury items. In a real sense, then, all items not neces-
sary to sustain life are in competition for the consumer's luxury
dollar. For example, a family might deliberate between acquiring
a second automobile or a boat, both manufactured by the same
corporation and offered at the same price. A commercial standard,
which evaluates the likeness of articles only with respect to con-
sumer response to price, would place the boat and the car within a
requisite degree of "likeness" for Robinson-Patman Act jurisdic-
tion, a patent absurdity. The physical comparison test of the lab-
oratory approach would quickly exclude these two items from
these strictures, despite the hypothetical equal appeal to consumers.
148 See 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1335, 1338-39 (1959). Despite the possibility that the
advertisement of a single Unox product might indeed promote the entire line, this
alone does not render the products of that line of like grade and quality. That stand-
ard has been imported into § 2(d) (see note 1 supra) and if it yields a poor result
in this situation perhaps it should be read out; but there is no rationale for perverting
consumer acceptance of a brand into the foundation of a presumption of "like grade
and quality." The evaluation should be one of facts, not of presumption.
149 The statutory skeleton of "like grade and quality" has largely been fleshed
out by the Federal Trade Commission, with surprisingly little resistance by those
affected. See note 70 supra. That the doctrine has been developed in a fashion that
suits the Commission's purposes is, then, not surprising. However, it does not seem
likely that the Commission's uniform rejection of brand differentiation can or should
withstand the forces of erosion now in play. The late Mr. Justice Cardozo supplied
the words for an appropriate prognosis for the commercial standard:
Hypothesis is now reality. What was once a hint has been turned into a corn-
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Assignment of the commercial standard to the concept of
like grade has been proposed before,150 and that the statute re-
quires a difference in both the grade and quality of commodities
is not disputed.' 5 ' The task of physical comparision could most
logically be assigned to the concept of "like quality." This criterion
could perform the initial task of narrowing the field of products
which might be of like grade and quality to those commodities
which are so physically similar that such differences as exist are
too insubstantial to render them of unlike quality. These goods
would be of "like quality" within the meaning of the act. The boat
and the car would quickly be seen to differ in quality under this
test. To commodities which were found to be of like quality the
"like grade" criteria would be applied to evaluate the more subtle
competitive nuances. Commodities which were found to be of "like
grade" under the commercial standard of that concept would then
be of both like grade and quality and subject to the prohibitions
of section 2(a).
If the proposed division of labor between "like grade" and
"like quality" be accepted, the test for what constitutes commodi-
ties of "like quality" is somewhat imprecise, but perhaps the bound-
aries can be delineated. The outer boundaries of commodities of
like quality would clearly be determined by the "functional" or
"reasonable" interchangeability test of the relevant product market
mand. By fitting itself to the instance in multitudinous variations, the formula
has now authority when at first it had mere persuasion.
And further:
Now, the impulse or the energy that thus pushes a formula to mastery is
the driving force of order, of certainty, of rational coherence, as juristic aim.
[Consider the charges that the rigid Commission rule shackles competition
and is inconsistent with the antitrust philosophy which spawned the
Robinson-Patman Act.] The force has capacity to drive because discretion,
unmeasured and unregulated, is felt to open the door to tyranny and corrup-
tion. [Consider the evidence that the FTC has largely been allowed to develop
this doctrine without contest.] So it is that long before a principle or a rule
or a concept has become so firmly established that its title to govern is un-
challenged by pretenders, long before this, it will still have made its way,
slowly and hesitantly, into terrains of the law that are doubtful or disputed,
will still have peopled the legal scene with forms in its own mold. [Consider
the "meeting competition" cases of § 2(b)]. It must still compete with other
analogies, which may be able to show themselves to be more exact, more
expedient, more just.
If they fail in that showing, it will have the right of way.
Cardozo, "Jurisprudence," in Hall, Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
23 (1947). See Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process," in Hall, supra at
182-83.
150 Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 76 (1962).
151 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 156 (1955).
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introduced in the Cellophane case.15 2 If a seller offered a variety
of products bearing substantial or total physical distinctions, yet
each was functionally interchangeable with the others, they would
be goods of like quality. The selection among these of those which
were also of like grade, and therefore within the jurisdiction of
the act, would be the function of the commercial standard. A
pertinent example would be the glass and metal beer containers
found to be in the relevant product market in Continental Can Co.
v. United States.153 The two-step resolution proffered here is pre-
cisely the method previously submitted as the technique used by
the Supreme Court in determining the relevant product market in
the Sherman and section 7 Clayton Act cases.
The relevant product market approach, however, is too broad
for Robinson-Patman Act purposes. The problems of the Sherman
and section 7 Clayton Act cases are vastly different. Those situ-
ations require evaluation of the market position of one competitor
vis-a-vis the "rest of the field"; the functional interchangeability
test is well designed to discern what constitutes the perimeter of
"the rest of the field." In the Robinson-Patman Act cases, by com-
parison, the only products involved are those of one manufacturer. 54
The market position of that seller is not relevant to the determin-
ation of whether his products are like grade and quality, nor is the
fact of functional interchangeability conclusive of "like quality."'55
None of the Commission cases holding goods to be of like grade
and quality involved commodities which had nothing more in
common than functional interchangeability. Instead they dealt
with products which were substantially similar in composition,
differing perhaps in shape or in having an extra ingredient. And
properly so: the phrase "like quality" on its face would seem to
refer to commodities sharing similar physical properties in com-
position as well as performance.
Thus, where the relevant market approach to "like quality"
would draw Continental Can's glass and metal beer containers
within its sweep, and despite the fact that the commercial test
would find them to be of like grade, inclusion of such physically
distinct items within Robinson-Patman Act jurisdiction would be
unprecedented and unwarranted. To do so would be to shackle
a manufacturer marketing Continental's product mix with only
such price differences for his glass containers as could be cost justi-
fied, merely because he produced metal containers also. The more
152 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
153 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See note 106 supra.
154 See E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F2d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 1944).
155 See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 26
COMMENT
restricted and proper boundaries of the "like quality" test, then,
encompass commodities of substantial similarity, goods having
such appreciable identity that "laboratory techniques" cannot
yield further commercially meaningful distinctions. It is at this
point that the commercial standard of "like grade" could be fruit-
fully invoked for final resolution of the issue of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The argument for the commercial standard has an internal
consistency. It properly turns the focus of the "like grade and
quality" issue to the market. If the Robinson-Patman Act is to
function as an antitrust law, this is an essential development:
antitrust laws, after all, regulate competition, and competition is
measurable only in the market place. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion's "laboratory approach" to the issue ignores this facet of the
problem; economic fact is relevant and must be evaluated, not
the results of quantitative or qualitative chemical analysis alone.156
The adoption of the commercial standard, then, hauls the Robin-
son-Patman Act into line with antitrust philosophy and with the
approach proffered as the method used to solve analogous prob-
lems under the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.157
The commercial standard resolves the problem of the anticom-
petitive results engendered by past Federal Trade Commission
policy, and heeds the admonition of the Supreme Court that the
Commission's policies should not be allowed to
extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so,
help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict
with the purposes of other antitrust legislation.158
James R. Beatley, Jr.
156 See Edwards, "The Economic Horizon," in 24 A.B.A. Section of Antitrust L.
Proceedings 67, 72-74 (1964).
157 See note 106 supra.
258 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953).
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